Redistribution of wealth through cross border financial transactions: A closer look by Nizam, Ahmed Mehedi
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Redistribution of wealth through cross





MPRA Paper No. 109374, posted 26 Aug 2021 08:30 UTC
Redistribution of wealth through cross





Contrary to existing literature, here we consider the foreign exchange reserve
balance of a particular country as an indicator of how much goods, services and/or
physical asset the country has transferred to the rest of the world in exchange of
some fiat foreign currencies. On the other hand, the reserve balances of the rest of
the world denominated in the currency of that particular country can be considered
as the amount of goods, services and/or physical assets that the particular country
has received from the rest of the world in exchange of its own fiat currencies. Hence,
if we subtract the second quantity from the first one, we get an estimate of the
extent of net non-monetary wealth that the particular country has transferred so
far to the rest of the world in exchange of some fiat foreign money. We calculate the
amount of net non-monetary wealth (thus defined) transferred to and from some
major economies stemming from cross border financial transactions and analyze
their long term and short term dynamics using VECM. The main objective of
this study is to give a new perspective to what we conventionally mean by foreign
exchange reserve of a country: Instead of assuming the reserve balance of a country
as an asset we consider it as a measure of gross wealth (i.e., goods, services and
physical asset) the country has transferred so far to other countries around the
globe in exchange of some paper currencies with no intrinsic value.
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1 Introduction and the history of US dollar as a hard 1
currency 2
Nowadays US dollar tends to dominate international foreign exchange market although 3
it has not been so for so long. During the backdrop of the First World War US dollar 4
started to replace pound sterling on its way to becoming the leading international 5
currency of the world discharging a wide array of functionalities for the countries that 6
hold it [10]. Back in 1912 US turned out to be one of the leading trading nations in 7
the world. But to their dismay the exporters back in US found out that the banks 8
in their native land were unable and unwilling to provide for any kind of trade credit 9
1
directly to the exporters in US. Rather the banks in US used to seek acceptances through 10
their correspondent relationships with the banks in London and these acceptances were 11
eventually denominated in pound sterling [10]. Acceptances thus obtained were sold 12
in an active secondary market of individuals and institutions in London and in the 13
unusual and unlikely case where no party was intended to purchase the acceptance it 14
was inevitably offloaded to the Bank of England at the existing bank rate [10]. Thus 15
Britain’s early start as a trading nation, the existence of an active secondary market for 16
acceptances initiated by the banks in London and the Bank of England backstopping 17
any such unsubscribed acceptances led to the prominence of pound sterling in financing 18
cross border trade credit [10], [26], [28]. Apart from London’s proven advantages as a 19
facilitator in international trade credit, banks in US had to come across some regulatory 20
hurdles which resisted them from actively taking part in cross border market of trade 21
credits. National Banking Act prohibited the US banks to open offshore branches 22
while federal legislation stopped them from dealing with trade credit [10]. However, 23
Federal Reserve Act of 1913 gave generous permissions for the US banks to open offshore 24
branches and also allowed them to participate in cross border trade credit [10]. These 25
regulatory reforms along with the advent of First World War in Europe closed the 26
international market of trade credit from London and pound sterling and opened it 27
for New York and US dollar. Since then US dollar starts to dominate international 28
foreign exchange market and nowadays performs a diverse set of roles including but not 29
limited to currency substitution, currency boarding [5], currency pegging [22], trade 30
invoicing [18], bond issuing [31], commodity pricing [6] and so on and so forth. These 31
multifarious roles of US dollar entice countries around the globe to hoard huge amount 32
of US dollars as part of their official reserve. In the process of stockpiling dollars the 33
countries transact real goods and services in exchange of US dollar which is no better 34
than any other fiat currencies with no intrinsic value within. This is also true for all 35
other reserve currencies like euro, Japanese yen, pound sterling, Australian and Canadian 36
dollar, Swiss franc, Chinese renminbi and others. However, the United States, Eurozone, 37
Japan, UK, Australia, Canada, Switzerland, China and any other countries native to 38
any of the hard currencies also maintain foreign exchange reserves which are essentially 39
denominated in currencies other than their own one. So, if we subtract the official 40
foreign exchange reserve of a country from the total amount of global foreign exchange 41
reserve denominated in the currency of that particular country then we will be able to 42
get a cumulative measure of real wealth (goods, services and/or physical assets) that the 43
country has transacted so far with the rest of the world in exchange of its fiat currency. 44
Here, we try to quantify the aforesaid amount of wealth transfer for some major global 45
economies including US, Eurozone, Japan and China and analyze their trends. Main 46
purpose of this study is to rethink the decisions of building up reserve balances in an 47
unreasonable proportion which, according to us, is detrimental to the country itself from 48
consumption, (consumption induced) welfare and ownership point of view. The rest of 49
the article is organized as follows. In Section: 2 we try to investigate why countries tend 50
to accumulate foreign exchange reserve in the first place. Section: 3 elaborates how the 51
official foreign exchange reserve of a country is created gradually through transactions 52
in current and capital account. Section: 4 discusses the role of fiat currency in wealth 53
redistribution and elaborates the scope of the current study. Section: 5 provides a brief 54
description of the official foreign exchange reserve of some major economies and the 55
amount of wealth thus transferred in the process. Section: 6 concentrates the intuitive 56
reasoning presented so far into a mathematical model. Section: 7 compiles the data 57
gathered from different sources and analyzes their long term trends. In Section: 8 we 58
sketch the methodology followed for the empirical measurement. Section: 9 discusses the 59
results of empirical analysis. Section: 10 explains some of the limitations of the current 60
study and its future scope. Finally Section: 11 concludes the article. 61
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2 Why countries choose to stockpile hard currencies 62
like dollar 63
• Store of value: Many countries around the globe often choose US dollar as a safe 64
store of value. It has been estimated that nearly 60% of all US dollars in circulation 65
were held outside the US as on 2005 [35] and these trends are even more noticeable 66
in recent times. For example, at the end of March, 2009 roughly 65% of the US 67
dollar issued or nearly 580 billion in physical US currency outstanding was circulating 68
outside the US [16]. Moreover, as on 2016 nearly 900 billion US dollar in physical 69
form were circulating in countries other than US which comprised 60% of all US 70
dollar issued at that point of time [27]. It has been observed that the demand for 71
US dollar increased steadily during the 1990s and into the early 2000s: A period 72
which witnessed several unprecedented political and economic turmoil including the 73
fall of the Berlin wall, the collapse of the Soviet Union and intermittent crisis in 74
different Latin American countries [27]. The fuss and confusion created thereby, lured 75
countries across the globe to hold physical dollars as a dependable store of value while 76
seeing an extreme volatility in their own domestic currencies. To date Russia and 77
different Latin American countries still hold majority of US dollar circulating beyond 78
the national boundaries [16]. Introduction of euro finally stabilized the demand of 79
dollar although it is highly unlikely for euro to dethrone US dollar from its current 80
role in recent times [16], [27], [30]. 81
• Medium of exchange in international trade: US dollar has been predominantly 82
used in international trade as an invoicing currency [18]. Using a sample of some 24 83
countries, Goldberg and Tille (2008) [15] have shown that US dollar happens to be 84
the currency of choice for both exports from and import to United States. Moreover, 85
drawing on their novel dataset, they have also shown that US dollar has also been 86
extensively used to facilitate international trade as a vehicle currency even when US 87
is not involved in the trade itself. Their second result, i.e., the role of the dollar as a 88
vehicle currency is further analyzed by Gopinath (2015) [17]. Gopinath (2015) [17] 89
has shown that the volume of international trade denominated in US dollar is far 90
more than the US’s role as exporter and importer. Gopinath (2015) further finds 91
that the share of dollar as an invoicing currency to facilitate cross border imports 92
is roughly 4.7 times the share of US goods in import while the same is found to be 93
nearly 1.2 for euro. This also happens to be true for export invoicing as observed by 94
Goldberg (2010) [16]. 95
• Low transaction cost: In a frictionless ecosystem of international trade there is 96
evidently no reason for cross border transactions between any two arbitrary countries 97
to take place in some vehicle currency [7]. Countries that are involved in such 98
kind of transactions can easily use their own local currencies to facilitate trades 99
between them. However, transaction costs associated with trading in local currencies 100
tempt traders away from using their local currencies and make them more prone to 101
utilize a widely traded and internationally accepted vehicle currency to facilitate such 102
trades [29], [4], [7]. Regardless of the benefits obtained by the traders in the process 103
this eventually provokes an eventual asymmetry in international financial market and 104
thus gives birth to a dominant international currency. Transaction costs associated 105
with the trading in local currencies mainly stem from the fact that now the financial 106
intermediaries have to maintain sufficient balances in a whole spectrum of accounts 107
denominated in different currencies. 108
• Sustained liquidity: Apart from low transaction cost another desirable characteristic 109
for a truly international currency is that it has to maintain sufficient liquidity in the 110
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international market even amidst financial instabilities. It is to be noted in this regard 111
that during the peak of the global financial crisis of 2007-2008 US dollar successfully 112
maintained sufficient liquidity in the trading market which greatly reinforced its role 113
as a truly international currency. Moreover, at the height of the global financial crisis 114
dollar denominated assets performed distinctively well which eventually cemented its 115
position in international currency market [30], [19]. 116
• Socio-economic stability: Socio-Economic stability of a region often adds signif- 117
icantly to the choice of the hard currencies. To further investigate the matter we 118
can take a look at the path dollar and euro have traversed on their way to becoming 119
international currencies and also how one surpasses the other significantly in the 120
race. Since the introduction of euro back in 1999 its global usage as an international 121
currency grew steadily and within 2005 it appeared to become one of the leading cur- 122
rencies alongside dollar [30]. However, after that and during the global financial crisis 123
it happens to lose ground to dollar and dollar denominated international corporate 124
bonds see a huge surge in use only at the expense of euro [31]. Moreover, Maggiori, 125
Neiman and Schreger (2019) [30] have also shown that the dominance of US dollar 126
is not confined to the internationally traded bond market. Rather starting roughly 127
around the peak of sub-prime crisis it is equally observed across many other aspects 128
of international currency use. It has been argued that dollar’s sustained liquidity 129
during the crisis coupled with sovereign debt crisis in the Eurozone and its subsequent 130
instabilities added greatly to the retreat of euro on its race of becoming the leading 131
international currency [30]. Instability in the Eurozone mainly stemmed from the 132
probable exit of several nations like United Kingdom and others from EU making the 133
investors and lenders alike reluctant to trade on a currency like euro, the existence of 134
which was then merely trembling in the balance. 135
• Currency substitution: Many countries across the globe have chosen to replace 136
their own currencies either completely or partially by the US dollar after declaring 137
the same as legal tenders inside their countries [5]. Within these countries US dollar 138
has been extensively used to transact goods and services in both local and foreign 139
market. To date US dollar has been used to completely replace local currencies 140
in British Virgin Islands, Caribbean Netherlands , El Salvador, Marshall Islands, 141
Federated States of Micronesia, Palau and Turks and Caicos Islands. The list of 142
countries that use US dollar alongside their own currencies is even longer and currently 143
includes Argentina, Barbados, Belize, Cambodia, Iraq and many more. However, US 144
dollar is not the only currency that is used as legal tenders beyond their national 145
boundaries: Australian dollar, euro, Indian rupee, New Zealand dollar, South African 146
rand, Armenian dram, Brunei dollar, Danish kroner, Egyptian pound, Hong Kong 147
dollar, New Israeli shekel, Jordanian dinar, Russian ruble, Swiss franc and Turkish lira 148
enjoy the same status in various proportions. The main benefit the countries reaped 149
in by adopting a hard currency as legal tender is the reduced transaction cost [1] and 150
less volatility in international trade [25] which facilitate economic integration with 151
the rest of the world [3], [34]. Other than trade benefits currency substitution offers 152
greater discipline in monetary and fiscal arena, enhanced macroeconomic stability 153
and financial deepening [25]. 154
• Pegged exchange rate regime: Although quite a few countries have either fully or 155
partially replaced their currencies with some hard currencies, other countries with not 156
so strong currencies of their own are more conservative in approach and instead of 157
declaring a foreign currency as legal tenders they tend to peg their currency against 158
some hard currencies. These countries intend to maintain a fixed predefined exchange 159
rate for their currencies against US dollar, euro or some other currencies or currency 160
basket with a view to reduce volatility in foreign exchange market. According to 161
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the de facto classification of exchange rate arrangements around the globe carried 162
out by IMF, currently 43 countries are following some form of pegged exchange rate 163
mechanism [22]. Among these 43 (forty three) countries, 14 (fourteen) countries peg 164
their currencies against US dollar, 18 (eighteen) others use euro as the reference 165
currency, 04 (four) use different currency-mixes as reference while the rest 07 (seven) 166
choose some other currencies as currency anchor. Typically countries that are intended 167
to peg their currency against some other currency must hold sufficient amount of 168
that reference foreign currency in order to stabilize any sharp spike or fall in the 169
currency market through open market operation [11]. Another less used mechanism 170
to maintain currency pegging is to declare currency conversion in any rate other than 171
the prescribed one as illegal. However, it is difficult to implement and may often lead 172
to the creation of black market for foreign exchanges inside the country. Nonetheless 173
some countries like China has been immensely successful in implementing the scheme 174
so far as intended [20]. 175
• Currency inertia: Once a currency establishes itself as an international currency 176
it continues to maintain its status due to inertia in currency usage [16]. As the 177
global financial system is adapted to the usage of that particularly strong currency it 178
becomes increasingly difficult to replace it with some other new currencies. In other 179
words the momentum an international currency attains once it establishes itself as a 180
hard currency places it even more firmly in global financial arena. Apart from its 181
essential role of store of value, medium of exchange and currency peg, more and more 182
new roles are created. For example, once the US dollar has solidified its position as a 183
hard currency more and more entities across the world start to issue sovereign and 184
corporate debt securities denominated in US dollar [30]. As on 2017 nearly 70% of all 185
cross border corporate bonds are denominated in US dollar whereas only 20% are 186
denominated in euro [31]. Moreover, share of US dollar in syndicated bank finance 187
reaches as high as 70% during 2017 with a trend pointing even upward [30]. It has 188
been argued that US dollar will continue to hold its position as a leading international 189
currency even if it starts to depreciate considerably [33]. Aside from the empirical 190
investigation of currency inertia Matsuyama et al. (1993) [32] provides a theoretical 191
foundation of currency inertia in the context of a random matching game. 192
3 How reserves are gradually built up through trans- 193
actions in current and capital account 194
Before delving into detail a few preliminary definitions are on the way: 195
• Net open foreign exchange position of commercial banks (NOP FX): 196
NOP FX is defined as the difference between foreign currency assets and foreign 197
currency liabilities of a particular bank and it is often treated to be one of the 198
core financial soundness indicators for banks [23]. If a bank’s foreign currency 199
assets are greater than its foreign currency liabilities then it is said to have a long 200
position. On the other hand when the foreign currency liabilities are greater than 201
the foreign currency assets of a bank then the bank’s position is termed as short 202
position. Particularly, NOP FX is a measure that indicates how much a bank might 203
gain/lose in the foreign exchange market due to the movements of exchange rate. 204
For example, if a bank has a net long position then an appreciation in domestic 205
currency will lead to less profitability for the bank in its foreign exchange holdings. 206
This is because the bank’s net foreign currency asset now means less in terms 207
of local currency. On the other hand if the bank has a net short position in FX 208
market then an appreciation in local currency will add to the profitability of the 209
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bank as the bank’s net foreign currency liability now means less in terms of local 210
currency. When the bank’s foreign currency asset perfectly matches its foreign 211
currency liability then the bank is said to have a balanced position which shields 212
the bank against exchange rate movements. To limit how much risk a bank may 213
take regulators in many if not all emerging market economies tend to set a specific 214
limit for NOP FX and this limit is often tied to the eligible regulatory capital of 215
the respective bank [21]. Higher the bank’s capital higher will be NOP FX limit as 216
capitals are often treated as a cushion against risk [2]. However, many developed 217
jurisdictions often refrain from setting up an explicit limit on NOP FX and in these 218
cases banks’ NOP FX limits are ultimately restricted by the risk based capital 219
holding requirements for the banks set out by Basel guideline [2]. We will discuss 220
about it in the next segment. 221
• Indirect limit for foreign currency holding: We have already discussed that 222
many advanced jurisdictions do not set up an explicit limit for NOP FX. However, 223
nowadays central banks in the developed countries are actively advocating the 224
implementation of the recommendations of Basel-III accord [2] in the commercial 225
banks under their respective jurisdictions [9], [12]. According to the first pillar 226
of the Basel-III accord each bank should maintain at least 8% of its total risk 227
weighted asset as capital [2]. Minimum Capital Requirement (MCR) under the 228
applicable provision of Basel-III is calculated by considering risk weighted assets for 229
credit, market and operational risk [2]. If the risk weighted asset associated with 230
any of these 03 (three) risks increases then MCR also increases. If the bank fails 231
to maintain required MCR then it may fall into regulatory treatment. So, banks 232
always try to keep adequate capital by restricting the growth of risk weighted asset 233
in all three buckets. As net uncovered foreign exchange position of the bank or 234
NOP FX is a significant contributor to market risk there is a natural urge from 235
the banks to keep their NOP FX as low as possible. This implicitly prohibits the 236
banks from holding an ever increasing amount of foreign currency assets and/or 237
liabilities. 238
As we are done with the basic definitions we now discuss how transactions in current 239
and capital account can build or deplete a country’s official foreign exchange reserve. 240
Following illustration, i.e., Fig: 1 graphically presents the flow of non-monetary assets 241
and fiat money arising from cross border transactions between any particular country 242
and the rest of the world. 243
Country A Rest of the
World (ROW)
FDI by A, Purchase of
Foreign Asset By Local
Entity, Import, Outward
Remittances, FX
Deposits/Debts by A, War
reparations received by
ROW from A
Flow of goods, services and physical asset
Flow of fiat money
FDI to A, Purchase of Local
Asset By Foreign Entity,
Export, Inward
Remittances, War
reparations received by A
from ROW
Fig 1. Flow of non-monetary assets and fiat money
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• Import: When an importer makes payments for his import generally he has two 244
ways. He can either make payment from his own foreign currency account. Or if 245
the applicable law permits he may request his bank to make payment for his behalf 246
either by submitting an equivalent amount of local currencies or by creating a loan 247
account against his name. In either case the bank has to remit the equivalent amount 248
of foreign currencies abroad. If the bank has sufficient foreign currency balance in its 249
respective nostro account then it will not hamper the official foreign currency reserve 250
of the country. If however the bank does not have required foreign currency to make 251
import payment then it may wish to purchase the same from the local central bank. 252
In this case the official foreign currency balance of the importing country reduces by 253
the importing amount. 254
• Export: When an exporter receives his export proceeds in foreign currencies he can 255
do two things with it. Either he retains the foreign currency balance in his account or 256
he may wish to convert it into equivalent local currency from a bank in order to meet 257
his day to day business expenditures. In the later case the foreign currency balance 258
of the exporter’s bank increases. Increased foreign currency balance may make the 259
exporter’s bank breach its own NOP FX limit. Even if the exporter’s bank does not 260
breach its NOP FX limit the above phenomenon must increase the bank’s overall 261
market risk and bring it into the realm of enhanced capital requirements according to 262
the applicable provision of the Basel accord. In either case the exporter’s bank may 263
choose to sell a portion of its foreign currency holdings to the local central bank. If 264
the central bank agrees to purchase the foreign currencies from the exporter’s bank 265
only then the official reserve of the exporting country increases. 266
• Inward remittances by domestic factor: Domestic factor serving abroad may 267
earn foreign currencies and may wish to remit it to its native land. To do so, the 268
factor may wish go to any of the offshore branches of a local bank and gives it the 269
amount in foreign currency to remit it to its native land. In this case the bank 270
purchases the foreign currency and gives an equivalent amount of local currencies to 271
the designated beneficiary in the factor’s native land. Again by purchasing foreign 272
currency the bank increases its market risk or even breaches its NOP FX limit. In 273
either case it may wish to sell the foreign currency to the local central bank. If the 274
central bank native to the factor serving abroad purchases the foreign currency then 275
it will add up to the official reserve of the factor’s local land. 276
• Outward remittances by foreign factor: Foreign factor serving within a country 277
may wish to remit a portion of its income abroad. This is just the opposite case 278
of what we have discussed in the previous section. In this case the official foreign 279
currency balance of the foreign factor’s native land may increase in the process. 280
• Purchase of foreign asset by local entity: If any local entity intends to purchase 281
foreign asset then in the first place he may go to his bank with equivalent amount of 282
local currency (or apply for a credit line from the bank) to initiate a foreign remittance 283
to seller of the foreign asset abroad. If the bank agrees, the local legislation permits and 284
the bank has sufficient foreign currency balance then it may initiate the transaction 285
and local official foreign currency reserve is effectively left unaffected. If however the 286
bank does not have sufficient FX balance then it may wish to purchase it from the 287
local central bank and in this case the local foreign currency balance is depleted by 288
the amount purchased and remitted abroad. 289
• Purchase of local asset by foreign entity: If a foreign entity intends to purchase 290
any local asset then it must remit an equivalent amount of foreign currency through 291
any of the local banks. The bank that receives the inward remittances gives equivalent 292
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local currency to the foreign entity with which the purchase is made. Purchasing 293
foreign currency inevitably increases the local bank’s market risk or it may even 294
breach its permissible NOP FX limit. In either case if the bank sells any amount of 295
its foreign currency holding to the local central bank then it will eventually adds to 296
the local country’s official foreign exchange balance. 297
• Foreign Direct Investment (FDI): When a country receives FDI from some 298
other country then the fund can be channeled through two plausible ways: either it 299
transmits through some local commercial banks or it may do so through the local 300
central bank at the receiving end. If the FDI is sponsored by some foreign private 301
sector entity then it is generally transmitted through some of the local commercial 302
banks in the receiving country. In this case, the local commercial banks that receive 303
the foreign currency fund will give away an equivalent amount of local currencies to 304
the foreign entity or its representatives that initiate the remittance. The local bank 305
may choose to sell its foreign currency receipt thus obtained to the local central bank 306
for at least 03 (three) main reasons: 1) in order to meet up its day to day expenditure 307
2) to maintain its NOP FX limit and 3) to curb market risk and capital charge thereon 308
according to the applicable provision of the risk based capital adequacy guideline 309
issued by the Basel Committee of Banking Supervision. Once the commercial banks 310
sell out their foreign currencies to the local central bank it gets reflected into the 311
country’s official foreign exchange reserve balances. On the other hand, with local 312
currency thus received the foreign entity will then acquire local assets i.e., it may buy 313
lands, machineries and other equipments for investment purpose. Instead of direct 314
investment, the foreign entity may also choose to invest in the local stock market and 315
in this case it gets the ownership of some companies’ which hold physical assets. In 316
both cases, the foreign entity gets the ownership of real assets in exchange of some 317
fiat foreign currency. However, if the initial foreign investment is sponsored by the 318
foreign government then the fund usually transmits through the central bank and 319
immediately gets reflected into the reserve balance of the receiving country. The rest 320
of the steps are same as above. 321
• Foreign currency deposits and debts: When a country receives foreign currency 322
deposits and/or foreign currency debts then its reserve balance is immediately in- 323
creased. However, unlike all the transactions discussed above no immediate transfer 324
of ownership of goods, services and/or physical assets takes place in the process. 325
Nonetheless, these foreign currency deposits and debts are supposed to be paid back in 326
foreign currencies and these foreign currencies are in turn earned by the deposit/debt 327
receiving country through any of the aforementioned transactions i.e., export, inward 328
remittances etcetera which involves exchange of physical assets for some fiat currencies. 329
Thus the contribution of foreign currency deposits and debts in the official foreign 330
currency reserve of a country represents the future (deemed) transfer of wealth by 331
the receiving country to its foreign creditors for some paper currencies during the 332
time of settlement. 333
• War reparations: Unlike anything mentioned above a country may receive repara- 334
tions in foreign currency for damages caused by the war usually from its defeated foes. 335
War reparations add to the receiving country’s reserve balances. However, the portion 336
of a country’s official reserve balances that are attributed to such compensations 337
does not directly involve any transfer of physical wealth from the receiving to the 338
giving entity. But, if we consider the mechanism inside such reparations then we 339
will be able to reconcile all of its disparities with the other transactions mentioned 340
above. During the war the defeated country inflicted damages in terms of physical 341
assets to the compensation receiving country. Thus we can safely assume that the 342
country that makes such compensation takes possession of the now-destroyed physical 343
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asset (of current book value of zero) previously belonging to the winning country and 344
the winning country receives payment in fiat foreign money which immediately gets 345
reflected into its reserve balances. 346
4 Role of the fiat currency in wealth redistribution 347
and the scope of the current study 348
Although the ancient history of the fiat money can be traced back to the 12th century 349
China [37] its modern history began only in the early nineteen seventies when president 350
Nixon of United States unilaterally cancelled the covenants of the Bretton Woods 351
conference and suspended the direct convertibility of US dollar to gold [38]. Since the 352
collapse of the Bretton Woods agreement most (if not all) of the world’s currencies are 353
fiat currencies, i.e., they are not backed by any valuables like gold, silver etcetera. The 354
modern fiat money system is in fact incidentally designed to exacerbate global income 355
inequality through at least five main channels namely inflation tax channel, savings 356
redistribution channel, interest rate exposure channel, earning heterogeneity channel and 357
income composition channel [40]. Inflation tax channel stresses that unexpected inflation 358
will disproportionately hurt the households that rely more on cashes to conduct their 359
day to day transactions. It has been argued that the low income households tend to use 360
more cash based transactions as compared to their wealthier counterparts and they are 361
the ones that are most vulnerable to the (negative) redistributive effect of inflation [39]. 362
Thus the welfare cost of inflation is substantially higher for low income households 363
than their wealthier peers and thereby inflation may be treated as regressive taxes on 364
consumption [39]. The second channel namely the savings redistribution channel posits 365
that inflation revalues nominal balance sheet of the households and/or firms where the 366
debtors gain at the expense of the creditors [41]. Using the savings redistribution channel 367
Doepke and Schneider (2006) [42] has shown that the young, middle class households 368
will be benefitted most from moderate inflation episodes as they tend to hold long-term 369
nominally denominated debt in the form of fixed-rate mortgages. On the other hand the 370
main losers will be the rich and elderly households that own majority of government 371
bonds as assets. The third channel of wealth distribution through monetary policy 372
decisions under fiat money system is the interest rate exposure channel which postulates 373
that a decrease in real interest rate will result into an increase in the value of the financial 374
assets. Financial assets appreciates as their future cash flows, i.e., coupon payments, 375
dividends are now discounted with a reduced rate. It has been argued that a decline in 376
real interest rate would redistribute wealth from the short term deposit/bond holders to 377
those who hold long term investments and/or adjustable rate mortgage liabilities [41]. 378
The fourth channel through which monetary policy actions contribute to income and 379
wealth redistribution is known as the earnings heterogeneity channel. According to this 380
channel labor incomes are disproportionately affected by monetary policy shocks, i.e., 381
incomes of high end and low end households may respond differently to monetary policy 382
decisions [43]. Moreover, these responses are not uniform across peoples of different age 383
groups, racial and ethnic categories with different skill sets [44]. The fifth mechanism 384
through which the monetary policy decisions under a fiat currency system may intervene 385
into the income distribution is known as the income composition channel. The idea 386
behind the income composition channel is rather simple: Households at different regions 387
of income distribution may rely upon different means of income generation. For example, 388
the low income households tend to rely upon transfer payments and food stamps whereas 389
the middle income groups depend upon the labor income and high end groups rather 390
rely on business and capital income [40]. As these heterogeneous income sources respond 391
quite differently to incumbent monetary policy shocks so will do the household incomes 392
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at different ends of the income distribution. 393
Literature cited above tends to describe the distribution of monetary wealth inside a 394
country (or a consortium of countries in a monetary union) through monetary policy 395
decision under a fiat currency system. In the above literature wealth indicates monetary 396
or nominal wealth. Here, in the first step, we redefine wealth as the ownership of physical 397
assets, consumable goods and entitlement to certain services instead of some monetary 398
balances that may rest in a bank account. For example, in the context of the current 399
discourse, imports adds to the total wealth of the importing country as it gets ownership 400
of real (non-monetary) assets in exchange of some fiat foreign exchange balances with no 401
intrinsic value. In contrast, export transfers real goods and services from the exporting to 402
the importing country and thereby reduces the total wealth of the exporting country in 403
exchange of some fiat monetary gain. Thus, through cross border financial transactions 404
some countries get the ownership of real goods, services and physical assets while the 405
others tend to accumulate balances in their reserve account and these reserve balances 406
are no better than some figures in a table with no consumable value within. Although, 407
the reserve balances can be used to purchase real goods, services and physical assets in 408
the international market, its value can only be realized when such a purchase actually 409
takes place, i.e., unless it is used it does not deliver any value. Here, after redefining 410
wealth in such a (non-monetary) way we analyze the role of cross border transactions 411
in current and capital account in the distribution of non-monetary wealth amongst the 412
participating countries. 413
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Fig 2. Total allocated foreign currency reserve of the whole world in 2019. Data source:
IMF COFER Database [24]
According to the IMF COFER database [24] the total allocated foreign currency 415
reserve of the whole world during 2019 is found to be nearly USD 11.08 trillion. Fig: 2 416
demonstrates the currency-wise composition of the consolidated foreign exchange reserve 417
of the whole world. Reserve balances maintained in currencies other than US dollar 418
are converted into equivalent US dollar amount by using the year end market exchange 419
rate [24]. From Fig: 2 it is evident that USD 6744.83 billion or 60.90% of the total allo- 420
cated foreign exchange reserve of the world is maintained in US dollar while USD 2279.30 421
billion or 20.58% is maintained in euro. Starting as an international reserve currency back 422
in 2016 Chinese renminbi contributes to around 1.95% of the total foreign currency re- 423
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serve of the whole world. However, it is still preceded by Japanese yen and British pound. 424
425
So far we have seen that the world’s official foreign currency reserve is primarily 426
denominated in US dollar. Now let us have a look at the foreign exchange reserve main- 427
tained by the United States itself. According to the data reported in IMF international 428
Financial Statistics (IFS) and World Bank [36] total official reserve balances of US is 429
found to be USD 118 billion in 2019 which is substantially lower than the US dollar 430
denominated official reserve balances of the rest of the world. If we superimpose official 431
foreign exchange reserve of United States with the dollar denominated foreign reserve of 432















































































Fig 3. US Reserve VS reserves of the rest of the world in US dollar. Data
sources: [36], [24]
From Fig: 3 we see an ever increasing gap between dollar denominated foreign 434
exchange reserve of all countries except United States and the official reserve balance 435
of United States itself. Official reserve balance of United States does not rise much 436
from 1995 to 2019. Rather it is seen to maintain a relatively steady level and in 2019 it 437
reaches nearly USD 118 billion in equivalent amount. However, during the same period 438
US dollar denominated reserve asset across the globe has been soared into a formidable 439
level as can be seen from the snapshot of 1995-2019 and the gap between these two series 440
is steadily increasing ever after. In fact, like other countries the official reserve balances 441
of United States have been accumulated over the course of time from the transactions in 442
current and capital account. It is an indication of cumulative amount of wealth (goods, 443
services and/or physical asset) that US has transacted for some fiat foreign currencies. 444
On the other hand, dollar denominated reserve balances of the rest of world indicate the 445
amount of real goods, services and assets the rest of world has produced and transacted 446
for US dollar which itself is a fiat currency with no intrinsic value. Thus the gap between 447
the two indicates the net amount of real goods, services and/or physical assets that have 448
been either transported to United States physically or some US entities have acquired the 449
ownership of it so far in abroad or some other US entities have consumed an equivalent 450
amount of services in the process in exchange of fiat US dollar. 451
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6 Proposed model for cross border non-monetary 452
wealth transfer 453
To begin with let us assume that RAB denotes the official reserve balance of country A
denominated in the currency of country B. Let us also assume RBA denotes the official
reserve balance of country B denominated in A’s currency. Then the amount of net
wealth transferred to country A from country B is given by the following:
WA = RBA − RAB
If RBA > RAB then WA will be positive. It implies that country A has gained net wealth
(in goods, services or physical assets) from country B in exchange of its own fiat currency.
However, if RBA < RAB then it means country A instead has transferred net wealth to
country B and has received payment in fiat currency of country B. When RBA = RAB
then it means no net transfer of wealth between the two countries has occurred and
the system is in the balance. The above idea can be extended for multiple countries as
well and to do so let us assume there are n different countries in the world which are
designated by the number 1 to n. Then for any country i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, Wi indicates the
amount of net wealth that has been transferred to country i from the rest of the world










The first operand on the right hand side indicates the total amount of reserve balances 454





Rij denotes the total reserve balances maintained by country i in all the 456
currencies other than its own. Thus Wi estimates the net amount of wealth that has 457
been transferred to country i in exchange of the intrinsically valueless fiat currency of 458
country i. 459
7 Compiled data 460
To start with we collect time series data of total official foreign currency reserves without 461
gold for USA, Eurozone, Japan and China from World Bank Open Data [36]. We also 462
collect currency composition as well as the volume of the total allocated foreign currency 463
reserve of the whole world from IMF COFER database [24]. In the next step we subtract 464
the official foreign currency reserve of a country/region from the total official foreign 465
reserve of the whole world denominated in the currency of that particular country/region 466
in order to calculate the value of W . We calculate W for USA, Eurozone 1, Japan 467
and China. Choice of countries/regions stems from the facts that nearly 80.48% of the 468
world’s reserves are maintained in US dollar and euro while China and Japan jointly 469
hold 39.80% of the total allocated foreign currency reserves of the whole world [36], [24]. 470
The timeframe we use for our empirical analysis extends from 1999Q1 to 2019Q1. We 471
start from 1999 because it is when euro was introduced as a regional currency intended 472
for circulation inside the European Union replacing some of the dominant international 473
currencies of the world including Deutsche mark, French franc, Italian lira and many 474
more. Descriptive statistics of the time series values of W for China, Japan, Eurozone 475
and USA are presented in Table: 1. 476
1Eurozone is officially the set of countries inside the European Union that use euro as legal tenders and
currently includes Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain [13].
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Table 1. Statistical characteristics of W (in USD Billion) for China, Japan,
Eurozone and USA. Data sources: [36], [24]
Particular W (China) W (Eurozone) W (Japan) W (USA)
Mean -2019.52 820.06 -757.91 2953.87
Median -2416.04 963.40 -831.48 2693.45
Maximum -157.73 1890.47 -212.14 6608.65
Minimum -3859.17 -20.86 -1064.62 821.83
Std. Dev. 1316.35 540.10 243.22 1702.02
Skewness 0.19 0.02 0.97 0.62
Kurtosis 1.43 2.06 2.76 2.33
Jarque-Bera 8.84 3.02 12.82 6.66
Probability 0.01 0.22 0.00 0.04
Sum -163581.10 66425.19 -61390.37 239263.70
Sum Sq. Dev. 139000000.00 23336441.00 4732582.00 232000000.00
ADF t-Stat (Level) -1.2673 -1.7031 1.0291 -0.5448
p-value 0.8886 0.7409 0.9999 0.9794
Remark Non-Stationary Non-Stationary Non-Stationary Non-Stationary
Observations 81.00 81.00 81.00 81.00
From Table: 1 we can see that the mean values of W for China, Japan, Eurozone 477
and USA are $(-)2019.52, $(-)757.91, $820.06 and $2953.87 billion respectively. This 478
implies that China and Japan have so far transferred $2019.52 and $757.91 billion of 479
wealth (goods, services and/or ownership of physical assets) to the rest of the world and 480
have accumulated some paper currencies in return. On the other hand, Eurozone and 481
USA have acquired $820.06 and $2953.87 billion equivalent in real assets in the process. 482
As anticipated, the values of W for Chinese and Japanese data are significantly negative 483
(as evident from their soaring foreign currency reserve) while for Eurozone and US, the 484
values are significantly positive (which is also discernible from the dominance of US 485
dollar and euro in the official reserve portfolio of the rest of the world). Moreover, the 486
standard deviations of the 04 (four) W series are high as anticipated. Absolute values 487
of skewness for all the four series are found to be less than 1 (one) which imply that 488
the series are roughly unskewed. However, the kurtosis of the series are greater than 489
1 (one) in all cases which imply we have peaked series. As evident from the values of 490
kurtosis, Jarque-Bera test also suggests that the series do not follow normal distributions. 491
Moreover, the ADF test statistics suggest that all the series are non-stationary at level. 492









by the Native Country
in 2019
Reserve Maintained
By Other Countries in














Fig 4. Extent of wealth transfer (W) to US, Eurozone, Japan and China up to 2019.
Data sources: [36], [24]
Country/region wise data of national/regional reserve asset, currency-specific global 493
reserve asset and the quantity W for USA, Eurozone, Japan and China up to year 2019 494
are presented in Fig: 4. From Fig: 4 it can be seen that the reserve maintained by 495
US in 2019 amounts to USD 118.44 billion (shown in black). As for US, reserve assets 496
are maintained in any currency other than US dollar. On the other hand total amount 497
of reserve balance of the rest of the world denominated in US dollar is found to be 498
USD 6744.83 billion (shown in white) resulting into a W value of USD 6626.40 billion 499
(shown in grey). The value of W indicates that net real asset purchased by US by its fiat 500
currencies from the rest of the world amounts to USD 6626.40 billion up to year 2019. 501
Next from Fig: 4 it is evident that the total official foreign currency reserve maintained 502
by the 19 countries in the Eurozone amounts to nearly USD 329 billion (black column) 503
while the reserve asset of the rest of the world denominated in euro is found to be 504
approximately USD 2279.30 billion (white column) which far exceeds the accumulated 505
reserve asset of the entire Eurozone. This implies that cumulative amount of net wealth 506
up to 2019 that has been transferred to the countries in the Eurozone from the rest of 507
the world in exchange of their fiat money (euro) is simply the difference between the 508
two or USD 1950.30 billion (grey column). 509
So far we have seen that US and Eurozone have obtained real assets from the rest 510
of the world in exchange of their hard currencies. On the opposite side of the mirror 511
there must be other countries in the globe that have added significantly to the process. 512
In fact the countries that tend to hold the majority of dollar and euro denominated 513
reserves are the ones that fueled such flow. According to the IMF COFER database [24] 514
China and Japan are the two countries that jointly hold a substantial portion of the total 515
foreign exchange reserve of the whole world. In 2019 total foreign exchange reserve of 516
China amounts to nearly USD 3127.49 billion which is mostly denominated in US dollar 517
while Japan comes at second with USD 1284.97 billion. On the other hand Chinese 518
renminbi now appearing as a reserve currency currently accounts for 1.95% of the world 519
reserve. Moreover, Japanese yen has long been treated and used as a reserve currency 520
by the rest of the world and to date 5.70% of the world reserves are denominated in 521
it. Although the Chinese renminbi and Japanese yen nowadays are widely regarded as 522
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reserve currencies across the globe the reserves denominated in these two currencies 523
are disproportionately low as compared to the reserves maintained by these countries 524
resulting into a net transfer of wealth from these regions to the rest of the world. Thus 525
the value of W is expected to be negative for these countries and as can be seen from 526
Fig: 4 it amounts to USD (-) 2911.68 billion and (-) 653.97 billion for China and Japan 527
respectively. How national/regional reserve assets and global currency-specific reserve 528



















































































Fig 5. Trend of country-wise and currency-wise reserves. Data sources: [36], [24]
Fig: 5 presents historical data of official foreign currency holding of US (series 1), 530
Eurozone (series 3), China (series 5) and Japan (series 7) from 1999 to 2019. From 531
this figure it is evident reserve assets of US and Eurozone are very low as compared 532
to the reserves of China and Japan. However, the exact opposite holds true for the 533
reserve assets denominated in the currencies of these countries/region where US dollar 534
and euro denominated reserves top the list while the reserves maintained in Japanese 535
yen and Chinese renminbi are quite low. The significant difference between the two 536
series attributes to the net transfer of wealth from China and Japan towards USA and 537
Eurozone. That means China and Japan have so far exchanged a substantial amount 538
of goods, services and/or physical assets to US and Eurozone in exchange of US dollar 539
and euro. By stockpiling US dollar and euro these countries have arguably obtained 540
substantial power to import goods and services to their lands in any time in the future. 541
However, the hoarding of US dollar and euro can be only justified if these countries 542
choose to use up their reserve for purchase and/or import of real goods and services. But, 543
they do not seem to use it at all and rather their reserve holdings are instead skyrocketing 544
day by day as can be seen from Fig: 5. These dynamics result into substantially positive 545
values of W for US and Eurozone at the expense of strikingly negative values of W for 546
China and Japan as can be seen from Fig: 6. 547
Fig: 6 shows that the values of W for USA, Eurozone, China and Japan have been 548
somewhat stabilized to these days. But, if we extrapolate them into the future using 549
ARIMA model then we can find the values of W for US and Eurozone will rise further 550
above whereas for China and Japan the values will dive into even deeper negatives after 551
crossing the apparent stagnation. The forecasting outcome is graphically presented in 552
Fig: 7. The details regarding ARIMA model selection are available upon request. 553
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Fig 7. Forecasted values of W for US, Eurozone, China and Japan. Data
sources: [36], [24]
8 Statistical methodology 554
As redistribution W involves transfer of goods, services and/or physical assets from one 555
country to another if we sum up the values of W across all countries around the globe 556
we will get a zero i.e.,
∑n
i=1 Wi = 0. This is because if the value of W is positive for a 557
country/region it implies some other countries/regions have transferred net wealth to 558
that particular country/region and hence the value of W will be negative for these some 559
other countries/regions. Hence, the values of W across different countries of the globe 560
should move together and in statistical term this co-movement means cointegration. 561
Before we can perform any test for cointegration like the Johansen Test, ARDL Bounds 562
Test or something like this we need to determine the appropriate order of integration of 563
our underlying time series. So the first step of our empirical analysis involves determining 564
the order of integration of W for different countries/regions under consideration. We 565
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use ADF Unit Root Test and Phillips-Perron Test to do so and we consider the time 566
series values of W for USA, Eurozone, China and Japan during the time period 1999Q1 567
to 2019Q1. These time sereis of W for USA, Eurozone, China and Japan are denoted by 568
WU , WE , WC and WJ respectively. 569
As we will mention in the next section all the time series are found to be I(1) which 570
qualifies them for Johansen Cointegration Test. Johansen Test seeks to determine the 571
probable number of cointegrating relations amongst the variables where each of the 572
cointegrating relations describes a stationary linear combination of WU , WE , WC and 573
WJ . Johansen Test comes up in two different flavors: One intends to rely on Trace 574
Statistic while the other depends upon Max-Eigen Statistic to determine the number of 575
equilibrating relationships. We report both the statistics here. 576
Once the cointegration amongst the variables has been confirmed we construct the 577
long run cointegrating relation as well as 04 (four) Error Correction Models (ECM) (one 578
for each of the endogenous variables) to describe the short run dynamics. The following 579
long run cointegrating relationship has been estimated: 580
WJ + A1 × WC + A2 × WU + A3 × WE + A4 = 0 (1)
where WJ , WC , WU and WE represent the values of W for Japan, China, USA and 581
Eurozone and A1, A2, A3 and A4 are constants. As we know from Granger Representation 582
Theorem [8] if a set of non-stationary time series variables are found to be cointegrated 583
then there exists certain Error Correction Mechanisms (ECM) to generate the series. 584
Here, we estimate the following ECMs to analyze the short run dynamics of the underlying 585
time series variables: 586
D(WJ) = C1 × CE + C2 × D(WJ(−1)) + C3 × D(WJ(−2)) + C4 × D(WC(−1))+
C5×D(WC(−2))+C6×D(WU (−1))+C7×D(WU (−2))+C8×D(WE(−1))+C9×D(WE(−2))
+ C10 (2)
D(WC) = C11 × CE + C12 × D(WJ(−1)) + C13 × D(WJ(−2)) + C14 × D(WC(−1))+
C15×D(WC(−2))+C16×D(WU (−1))+C17×D(WU (−2))+C18×D(WE(−1))+C19×D(WE(−2))
+ C20 (3)
D(WU ) = C21 × CE + C22 × D(WJ(−1)) + C23 × D(WJ(−2)) + C24 × D(WC(−1))+
C25×D(WC(−2))+C26×D(WU (−1))+C27×D(WU (−2))+C28×D(WE(−1))+C29×D(WE(−2))
+ C30 (4)
D(WE) = C31 × CE + C32 × D(WJ(−1)) + C33 × D(WJ(−2)) + C34 × D(WC(−1))+
C35×D(WC(−2))+C36×D(WU (−1))+C37×D(WU (−2))+C38×D(WE(−1))+C39×D(WE(−2))
+ C40 (5)
In the above set of equations CE represents the long run cointegrating relation 587
amongst the variables and Ci, ∀1≤i≤40 denotes the coefficients of CE in respective ECM 588
(C1, C11, C21 and C31), coefficients of different lagged terms of the endogenous variables 589
(C2, C3, C4, C5, C6, C7, C8, C9, C12, C13, C14, C15, C16, C17, C18, C19, C22, C23, C24, C25, C26, 590
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C27, C28, C29, C32, C33, C34, C35, C36, C37, C38 and C39) as well as fixed regressors (inter- 591
cept) (C10, C20, C30 and C40). The choice of lag length for the endogenous variables in 592
the Error Correction Model (ECM) is inspired from the values of different information 593
criteria which are further elaborated in the next section. There are 04 (four) ECMs 594
for the 04 (four) variables each serving a designated purpose: If any of the variables 595
has been found deviated from its equilibrium position the respective ECM will bring it 596
back to its equilibrium. To serve this purpose the estimated coefficient of cointegrating 597
equation in the respective ECM must be negative and significant. Negativity of the 598
coefficients of cointegrating equation in the ECM represents a kind of mean reversion 599
process which is central to the concept of cointegration. 600
Apart from examining the presence of mean reversion in ECM we will also measure 601
the goodness of fit for each of them. We report the R-Squared, Adjusted R-Squared, 602
F-Statistic and probability of F-Statistic for each of the Error Correction Models (ECM). 603
Moreover, we also note down the values of Durbin-Watson Statistic for each of the model 604
to determine whether the residuals of the models suffer from serial correlation. 605
9 Results 606
We begin our analysis by performing ADF Unit Root Test and Phillips-Perron Test 607
which are intended to determine the order of integration of the time series used in the 608
analysis and the results are available upon request. It is to be noted from the results 609
that all the four variables namely WJ , WC , WU and WE are integrated of order one i.e., 610
I(1) which qualifies them for Johansen Cointegration Test. 611
Before we can run the Johansen Cointegration Test we need to determine the 612
appropriate number of lags to be used. To do so we build unrestricted VAR models 613
with lag lengths [1-4] for WU , WE , WC and WJ and note down the values of different 614
information criteria including Likelihood Ratio (LR), Final Prediction Error (FPE), 615
Akaike information criterion (AIC), Schwarz information criterion (SIC) and Hannan- 616
Quinn Criterion (HQC). Lag length that minimizes the majority of the information 617
criteria is selected as the optimal lag length to be used in Johansen Test as well as to 618
build appropriate Error Correction Model (ECM). Details of the lag length selection 619
process are available upon request. Optimal lag length is found to be 03 (three) which 620
minimizes 04 (four) out of 05 (five) information criteria. 621
Table 2. Johansen Cointegration Test using Trace Statistic
Null Hypothesis Trace Statistic Critical
Value (5%)
p-value
Number of Cointegrating Equation r = 0 71.80764 47.85613 0.0001
Number of Cointegrating Equation r = 1 44.40043 29.79707 0.0006
Number of Cointegrating Equation r = 2 19.09388 15.49471 0.0137
Number of Cointegrating Equation r = 3 0.886672 3.841466 0.3464
Once the optimal lag length has been selected we carry out Johansen Cointegration 622
Test. The results of the Johansen Test are depicted in Table: 2 and 3. From Table: 2 623
we can see that the values of the Trace Statistics are greater than the corresponding 624
critical values @5% level for r = 0, 1, 2 (Here, r denotes the number of cointegrating 625
equations). However, for r = 3 the value of the Trace Statistic is found to be 0.886672 626
which is lower than the critical value of 3.841466. Moreover, the corresponding p-value 627
is found to be 0.3464 which is greater than 5%. So, the null hypothesis of at most 03 628
cointegrating equations cannot be rejected @5% level. 629
August 25, 2021 18/27






Number of Cointegrating Equation r = 0 27.40721 27.58434 0.0526
Number of Cointegrating Equation r = 1 25.30655 21.13162 0.0122
Number of Cointegrating Equation r = 2 18.20721 14.2646 0.0113
Number of Cointegrating Equation r = 3 0.886672 3.841466 0.3464
However, the Max-Eigen Statistic produces quite different results regarding the 630
number of cointegrating equations @5% level. From Table: 3 we can see that null 631
hypothesis of r = 0 number of cointegrating equation cannot be rejected @5% level. 632
The Max-Eigen Statistics for no cointegration is 27.40721 which is slightly less than the 633
corresponding critical value of 27.58434 and the p-value is a little bit above 5% (5.26% 634
to be precise). But, if we consider 10% confidence interval instead of 5% then we can 635
reject the null hypothesis up to r = 2 number of cointegrating equations and accept it 636
for r = 3. In this case i.e., if we consider 10% confidence interval instead of 5% then the 637
results produced by Max-Eigen Statistics would be identical to that produced by Trace 638
Statistics which confers the presence of cointegration amongst the variables. 639
After the cointeration has been confirmed we construct a long run cointegrating 640
relationship amongst the variables. The estimated coefficients of the cointegrating 641
equation as described by Equation: 1 are given in Table: 4. 642
Table 4. Coefficients of Endogenous Variables in Cointegrating Relations
Particular A1 A2 A3
Coefficient 0.089123 −0.795393 2.490755
Standard Error 0.08652 0.13499 0.5034
t-Statistics 1.03014 −5.8924 4.94791
From the above cointegrating relation it can be noted that WJ is negatively related 643
to WC and WE (as can be seen from the positive values of A1 and A3). However, WJ 644
is found to be positively correlated to WU as evident from negative value of A2 in the 645
cointegrating relation. In the next step we substitute the values of A1, A2, A3 along with 646
the estimated value 1248.54 of the fixed regressor A4 into the Error Correction Models 647
and investigate into the statistical properties of the ECMs. It is to be noted that in the 648
ECMs described by Equation: 2-5 we have considered 02 lags for each of the endogenous 649
variables whereas the lag selection criteria suggest to take 03 lags for unrestricted VAR 650
models. This is because each of the endogenous variables has been differenced one time 651
in the ECMs which reduces the optimal lag length by 01. 652
Estimation results of the Error Correction Model-1 given by Equation: 2 are presented 653
in Table: 5 and 6. From Table: 5 it is evident that the coefficient of the cointegrating 654
relation (C1) in the ECM is −0.024521 and the corresponding p-value is 0.0096. Coeffi- 655
cient of the cointegrating relation C1 also known as the speed of adjustment represents 656
how fast the variable D(WJ ) will return to its long run equilibrium once distorted. The 657
negative value of speed of adjustment confers the presence of a mean reverting process 658
in ECM-1 which is highly desirable. Moreover, the p-value corresponding to the speed of 659
adjustment is found to be 0.0096 which is significant @5% level and denotes the presence 660
of a strong mean reverting process. 661
Apart from the speed of adjustment the only other significant variable in the estimated 662
ECM is C2 which is actually the coefficient of the first lagged term of WJ in the ECM. 663
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Table 5. Estimation Results for Error Correction Model: 1
Particular Coefficient Std.Error t − Statistic Prob.
C1 −0.024521 0.009197 −2.666148 0.0096
C2 0.274989 0.11714 2.34752 0.0218
C3 0.182757 0.117085 1.56089 0.1232
C4 0.069893 0.07003 0.998041 0.3218
C5 −0.088751 0.070849 −1.252681 0.2146
C6 0.012754 0.029716 0.429209 0.6691
C7 −0.03601 0.031998 −1.12538 0.2644
C8 −0.015321 0.052606 −0.291251 0.7717
C9 0.042422 0.053619 0.791179 0.4316







Table 6. Wald Test for Error Correction Model: 1
Null Hypothesis:
C4 = C5 = C6 = C7 = C8 = C9 = 0
Test Statistic V alue df Probability
F-statistic 0.4307 (6, 68) 0.856
Chi-square 2.584201 6 0.8589
Other than C1 and C2 none of the variable in the system is significant and it is evident 664
from the relatively small value of Adjusted R-Squared (0.383235). Although individually 665
most of the variables in the estimated ECM are not significant the model as a whole 666
represents a moderately good fit as the probability of F-Statistic is found to be 0.000002 667
which is significant @5% level. In the next step we perform Wald Coefficient Test in 668
the ECM and see how the lagged terms of D(WC), D(WU ) and D(WE) add to the 669
convergence of D(WJ) to its equilibrium. To do so we set the all the coefficients of 670
the lagged terms of D(WC), D(WU ) and D(WE) in the ECM to zero and check the 671
corresponding probability. The results are presented in Table: 6. F-Statistic and 672
Chi-Square value of the Wald Test are found to be 0.4307 and 2.584201 whereas the 673
corresponding p-values are estimated to be 0.856 and 0.8589 respectively. As both the 674
p-values are far above the 5% range we can not reject the null hypothesis. Hence, the 675
lagged terms of D(WC), D(WU ) and D(WE) have nothing to do with the convergence 676
of D(WJ) to its equilibrium as given by Equation: 2. So, although the ECM given 677
by Equation: 2 can effectively describe the long run relation amongst the variables it 678
is not so successful in explaining the short run dynamics. Moreover, the value of the 679
Durbin-Watson Statistic for the ECM-1 is found to be 2.153213 which is close to 2. This 680
indicates the ECM-1 does not suffer from the problem of auto correlation amongst the 681
residuals which is a desirable trait. 682
Estimation results of the Error Correction Model (ECM) given by Equation: 3 are 683
August 25, 2021 20/27
Table 7. Estimation Results for Error Correction Model: 2
Particular Coefficient Std.Error t − Statistic Prob.
C11 −0.001406 0.016467 −0.085381 0.9322
C12 0.086292 0.209734 0.411436 0.682
C13 −0.19331 0.209636 −0.922121 0.3597
C14 0.826442 0.125386 6.591203 0
C15 0.013956 0.126852 0.110017 0.9127
C16 0.169326 0.053205 3.182548 0.0022
C17 0.00466 0.057291 0.081336 0.9354
C18 −0.116843 0.094188 −1.240526 0.219
C19 −0.016188 0.096002 −0.168619 0.8666







Table 8. Wald Test for Error Correction Model: 2
Null Hypothesis:
C12 = C13 = C16 = C17 = C18 = C19 = 0
Test Statistic V alue df Probability
F-statistic 1.870803 (6, 68) 0.0985
Chi-square 11.22482 6 0.0817
noted down in Table: 7 and 8. From Table: 7 it is evident that the speed of adjustment 684
C11 is −0.001406 which is negative. But, C11 is not a significant variable in the estimated 685
ECM as can be seen from its p-value of 0.9322. Large p-value indicates that the ECM-2 686
represented by Equation: 3 is not mean reverting which is not desirable. Hence, no long 687
run co-movements amongst the variables are captured by this particular ECM. There 688
might be some other ECMs that would probably capture the dynamics better. Still 689
there might exist short run causalities among the variables as described by the ECM 690
under consideration. To check for short run causality running from D(WJ ), D(WU ) and 691
D(WE) to D(WC) we perform Wald Test on the coefficients of the different endogenous 692
variables. To be precise we set the coefficients of the first and second lagged terms 693
of D(WJ), D(WU ) and D(WE) to zero and check the corresponding test statistics and 694
p-values. From Table: 8 it is observed that the F-Statistic and Chi-Square values are 695
found to be 1.870803 and 11.22482 with p-values 0.0985 and 0.0817 respectively. Hence, 696
@10% level we can reject the null hypothesis which signifies that the lagged terms of 697
D(WJ), D(WU ) and D(WE) jointly can cause D(WC) in the short run @10% level. 698
Moreover, as can be seen from Table: 7 R-Squared and Adjusted R-Squared values of 699
the ECM are 0.808305 and 0.782934 respectively which are very high and thus represent 700
a very good fit. F-Statistic is found to be 31.85893 with p-value of 0.0. F-Statistic and 701
the corresponding p-value indicate that the model fits the empirical data very well. Last 702
but not the least the Durbin-Watson Statistic of the model is found to be 1.979034 which 703
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is very close to 2. The value of DW Statistic states that the model does not suffer from 704
autocorrelation problem and speaks for the validity of it. 705
Table 9. Estimation results for Error Correction Model: 3
Particular Coefficient Std.Error t − Statistic Prob.
C21 −0.14657 0.043176 −3.394692 0.0012
C22 1.061627 0.54992 1.930513 0.0577
C23 −1.131434 0.549662 −2.058418 0.0434
C24 0.341059 0.328759 1.037413 0.3032
C25 −0.44473 0.332603 −1.337118 0.1856
C26 −0.172915 0.139501 −1.239525 0.2194
C27 −0.308047 0.150216 −2.050695 0.0442
C28 0.40429 0.24696 1.63707 0.1062
C29 0.768746 0.251716 3.054023 0.0032







Table 10. Wald Test for Error Correction Model: 3
Null Hypothesis:
C22 = C23 = C24 = C25 = C28 = C29 = 0
Test Statistic V alue df Probability
F-statistic 2.881885 (6, 68) 0.0146
Chi-square 17.29131 6 0.0083
In the next step we estimate the coefficients of the Error Correction Model given by 706
Equation: 4 and the results are presented in Table: 9 and 10. From Table: 9 we can see 707
that the speed of adjustment of the ECM is −0.14657 and the corresponding p-value is 708
0.0012. Negative and significant speed of adjustment indicates a mean reverting process 709
which is a very desirable attribute for ECMs. Moreover, most of the estimated coefficients 710
from C22 to C30 are found to be significant @5% level which can possibly mean the 711
existence of significant short run causality from the independent to the dependent 712
variables. To check whether short run causality truly exists from D(WJ), D(WC) and 713
D(WE) to D(WU ) we perform Wald Test on the coefficients of the estimated ECM. We 714
set the coefficients of first and second lagged terms of D(WJ), D(WC) and D(WE) to 715
zero and note the probability of such an exclusion. However, this null hypothesis is 716
soundly rejected even @2% level as can be seen from the last column of Table: 10. 717
Once the long and short run causality have been confirmed we go on checking how 718
well the empirical data fit the model. R-Squared and Adjusted R-Squared of the model 719
are found to be 0.306587 and 0.214812 which are comparatively low. However, the 720
F-Statistic of the model is 3.34063 with p-value 0.001951. The p-value of the F-Statistic 721
however represents a good fit. Moreover, the Durbin-Watson Statistic is measured as 722
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2.032231 which is very close to 2 and asserts that the estimation does not suffer from 723
the problem of serial correlation. 724
Table 11. Estimation results for Error Correction Model: 4
Particular Coefficient Std.Error t − Statistic Prob.
C31 −0.113589 0.02154 −5.273295 0
C32 0.201965 0.274351 0.736154 0.4642
C33 −0.958241 0.274222 −3.494395 0.0008
C34 −0.041279 0.164016 −0.251677 0.802
C35 −0.232792 0.165933 −1.402922 0.1652
C36 −0.063282 0.069596 −0.909274 0.3664
C37 −0.313046 0.074942 −4.177199 0.0001
C38 0.234677 0.123206 1.904743 0.061
C39 0.421143 0.125579 3.353605 0.0013







Table 12. Wald Test for Error Correction Model: 4
Null Hypothesis:
C32 = C33 = C34 = C35 = C36 = C37 = 0
Test Statistic V alue df Probability
F-statistic 6.380645 (6, 68) 0
Chi-square 38.28387 6 0
Finally, we estimate the Error Correction Model given by Equation: 5 which describes 725
how D(WE) reverts to its equilibrium once distorted. The estimation results are presented 726
in Table: 11 and 12. From Table: 11 we can see that the speed of adjustment of the 727
ECM is −0.113589 which is negative and significant (p-value is zero). Negative and 728
significant speed of adjustment points to an underlying mean reversion process which 729
validates the construction of ECM itself. Moreover, a lot of the estimated coefficients 730
are found to be significant @5% level. To check precisely whether the lagged terms 731
of D(WJ), D(WC) and D(WU ) can really cause D(WE) we perform coefficient Wald 732
Test and the results are presented in Table: 12. To perform Wald Test we set all the 733
coefficients of different lagged terms of D(WJ ), D(WC) and D(WU ) in the ECM to zero 734
and note down the corresponding F-Statistic and Chi-Square Statistic with the p-values. 735
F-Statistic and Chi-Square Statistic are found to be 6.380645 and 38.28387 respectively 736
with p-value of zero in both cases. So, the null hypothesis is clearly rejected and there 737
exists strong causality running from D(WJ), D(WC) and D(WU ) to D(WE). 738
Last but not the least we will check how well the empirical data fit the model. To 739
do so we check the corresponding R-Squared and Adjusted R-Squared values which are 740
0.404437 and 0.325612 respectively which although not very good are not bad either. 741
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On the other hand the value of F-Statistic is 5.130846 with p-value 0.000027 which 742
represents a good fit. Moreover, the Durbin-Watson Statistic for the model is found 743
to be 1.976588 which is very close to 2 and thus represents a valid model free from 744
autocorrelation. 745
10 Limitations and future study 746
The current study is conducted on a sample of 22 (twenty two) countries around the 747
world, namely USA, China, Japan and 19 (nineteen) countries in the Eurozone. When 748
we choose countries we give weights to two distinct factors: Firstly, we consider the 749
dominance of a country’s currency in the international market and secondly, we account 750
for the extent of the foreign exchange reserves maintained by a particular country. Choice 751
of USA and Eurozone (comprising 19 countries to date) is motivated by the fact that 752
80.48% of the reserve balances of the entire world is denominated in US dollar and euro. 753
On the other hand, China and Japan are the two countries that maintain highest amount 754
of reserve balances in the whole world. To be precise, together they hold nearly 39.80% 755
of the total world reserves. The current study can be logically extended by including 756
more countries into the analysis. For example, there are other countries in the list whose 757
currencies enjoy the hard currency status to some extent in the international financial 758
market. The list of countries with reasonably hard currencies includes United Kingdom 759
(UK), Switzerland, Australia and Canada. Moreover, other than China and Japan, there 760
are countries that hold substantial amount of foreign exchange reserves which include 761
India, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), South Korea and so on. The study can be 762
further extended by including these countries into the analysis which is supposed to 763
produce more accurate measure of cross border wealth transfer amongst the nations. 764
11 Conclusion 765
Here, we argue that the official foreign currency reserve balance of a country when 766
subtracted from the accumulated reserve balances of the rest of the world denominated 767
in the currency of that particular country represents the net amount of real wealth that 768
has been transferred to that particular country from the rest of the world in exchange 769
of its fiat currencies. We have calculated the said amount of wealth transfer for some 770
major economies of the world including United States, China, Japan and Eurozone. We 771
have found that the value of net wealth transferred to United States and Eurozone are 772
positive and the official foreign exchange reserve balances of these regions are remarkably 773
low as compared to their peers. On the other hand, net wealth transferred from the rest 774
of the world to China and Japan are negative i.e., these regions have indeed transferred 775
substantial amount of real goods and services to the rest of the world in exchange of some 776
fiat currencies and that is why these countries have accumulated an astonishing amount 777
of reserve balances. These reserve balances unless utilized for import purposes do not 778
have any intrinsic value i.e., the real values of these reserves can only be discharged once 779
they are actually used for import payments. But, countries like China and Japan do not 780
seem to eat up their reserve balances rather they are accumulating more and more of 781
it and in the process of doing so they are transferring their real assets (goods, services 782
and/or physical asset) to the rest of the world which the other countries consume/use. 783
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